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I
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger poses the question, “Is there an attitudinal 
understanding in Dasein in which Dasein, in a remarkable way, is dis­
closed to itself?”* Heidegger’s answer, of course, is affirmative, and that 
attitudinal understanding, that gateway to self-discovery, we soon learn, 
is anxiety. Anxiety differs from fear in that, whereas fear occurs in con­
frontation with an object (or if not an object, a phenomenon, however 
intangible, which is comprehensible), anxiety always occurs in the pre­
sence of nothing—anxiety itself being this presence (of an absence)—the 
presence of that which is totally incomprehensible. Still, that which 
anxiety confronts is not merely nothing, for even nothing, Heidegger 
contends, has a ground. This ground is twofold: on a narrower level it 
is the world, which is indicative of Dasein’s being in that world, and on 
a broader level, the worldhood of the world—Being—to which the world 
is ontologically bound. More summarily, we read, in Heidegger’s hy­
phenated phrasing, Dasein is “an anticipatory drive-towards-Being, 
thrown-as-yet-to-be-realized (in-the-world) with beings (it encounters 
in the world).”1 2
1 “Gibt es eine veratehende Befindlichkeit im Dasein, in der ca ihm selbst in aus-
gezeichneter Weise erschlossen ist?” (Sein und Zeil [Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1927], p. 182). 
Hereafter cited as SZ. ’
2 “Sich-vorweg-«chon-s€in-in-(der-Welt-) ala Scin-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem 
Seienden)” (Ibid., p. 192).
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Still, though anxiety is most certainly a realization of the world and 
can lead to the realization of Being, it is more fundamentally a realiza­
tion of Non-being. What about Non-being?3 Non-being is not an additive 
to beings, nor does it, because of its power, annihilate them, but is most 
inextricably bound up with them. We must recall one of Heidegger’s 
most formidable statements: “In the bright night of the Non-being of 
anxiety, there arises for the first time the primordial openness of beings 
as such: that they are, in fact, beings—not Non-being.”*  And if both 
beings and Non-being are disclosed, it is obvious that they arc bound 
integrally in such a way that Non-being becomes the ontological source 
for the illumination of beings; moreover, that, in this illumination, they 
“are” for the first time genuinely and more vividly than they ever have 
“been.” Non-being, then, is the manifestation of the awareness of beings 
as beings (something we usually take for granted). As Heidegger puts it, 
“only when oppositeness is allowed to arise and be cast into Non-being 
can a conception, rather than Non-being and within it, allow what is 
in fact not Non-being, that is, such a thing as being, to reach an en­
counter, given that such a being empirically discloses itself.”5
1 Heidegger uses these very words, without my italics: “Wie steht es urn das Nichts ?” 
(Kant und das Problem dtr Metafrhysik [Frankfurt: KJostermann, 1951], p. JX). Hereafter 
cited as KM.
* “In dcr hellcn Nacht des Nichts der Angst erst eh t erst die ursprtlngliche Offenheit 
des Seienden als eines solchen: dass es Seiendes ist—und nicht Nichts” (Wzoj uf Mela- 
phjsik? [Frankfurt: KJostermann, 1955], p. 34)- Hereafter cited as WM.
9 “Nur wenn das Gegenstehenlassen von ... ein Sichhineinhaltcn in das Nichts ist, 
kann das Vorstellen anstatt des Nichts und innerhalb seiner ein nicht Nichts, d.h. so 
etwas wie Seiendes begegnen lasscn, falls solches sich gerade empirisch zeigt” (KAf, p. 71).
Though Non-being is responsible for the illumination of beings, it 
serves an even more profound and puzzling task: the illumination of 
Being. Though Non-being shakes the foundations of Dasein with its 
voidness, forcing Dasein into the realization that beings “are” and that 
Dasein (as a very special mode of being) “is,” Dasein can then extend this 
very elementary sense of “is” to a higher level—to Isness, to Being; for 
if there can be an ontological source beyond beings which, because of 
its voiding power, can force Dasein to realize beings in their elementary 
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givenness, it seems only likely that there is just as great an ontological 
source (closely bound up with this great “Not”) which allots beings the 
power of being. Non-being, thus, is the ontological catalyst which first 
allows beings to be realized as beings, only to further promote the realiza­
tion of beings in their beingness. As Heidegger explains, Non-being 
“reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings.”6 7
6 ‘‘Enthilllt rich ais zugehdrig zum Sein do Sei end en” (JFM, p. 39).
7 Ibid., p. 51.
Nonetheless, though one would think that, because one confronts 
Non-being and because Non-being reveals not only beings as beings, 
it is “likely” that there is also a beingness of beings (I am trying to under­
stand how Heidegger’s mind has construed this), this is not a normal 
occurrence. The fact is—the more prevalent fact is—that Being is con­
cealed. It is concealed because, according to Heidegger, on the ordinary 
level of consciousness we deal entirely on the plane of beings, oblivious of 
Being, and Being therefore hides behind or within them. But just as 
Being is responsible for the presence of beings (in its Beingness for the 
fact that they “are”), it is also just as responsible for the concealment of 
itself within them; and this concealing process is none other than the power 
of Non-being—what Heidegger refers to, most pertinently, as “the veil 
of Being” (der Schlaer des Sans').1 Non-being, then, is both the revealer 
and the concealer of Being, both the “not” of beings (in the sense of being 
antithetical to all that they “are” and, in turn, the catalyst for the realiza­
tion of the fact that they “are”) and the “not” of Being in its hiddenness.
It is evident in Heidegger’s philosophy that Being and Non-being are 
integrally connected. Although it is true that Non-being is the catalyst 
which awakens Dosan to the awesome fact that beings “are” and by 
further implication that Being is the Beingness of their being, when he 
addresses himself to this integralness, he usually speaks of Non-being 
as concealment, that is, the concealment of Being, making synonymous, 
thus, Non-being as concealment (Vaborgenhai) and Being as unconceal­
ment (Unoerborgenhat'). In other words, it is the nature of Being, despite 
its appropriation of beings, to conceal itself (as Non-being) within them; 
and, thus, on that ontological plane, a constant dialectical interplay exists 
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between Being and Non-being—to the point where Heidegger can speak 
of them as a “unity,” despite the obvious diversity. Heidegger feels justified 
in positing this unity because Non-being is never, in the finite sense, pure 
negativity, but transcends negativity, in the sense of being prior to nega­
tivity. As Heidegger explains, “Non-being is more original than the ‘not’ 
and ‘negation.’ ”® Non-being’s concealment transcends negativity in 
die finite sense because, existing on that higher ontological plane, and 
integrally bound with Being, Non-being can never “negate” Being, 
only conceal it. Unconcealment and concealment are part of the same 
ontological process: even though Being can be concealed, it can never 
be negated, for even in its concealment it always “is”; and even though 
Non-being conceals Being, Non-being itself is never “not.” On this onto­
logical plane of unconcealment and concealment, thus, both Being and 
Non-being “Are.”
Because Being and Non-being “Are,” one cannot come to terms 
with them through the level of thinking that one associates with beings, 
that is, on the level of finitude. But it is precisely through spectacles 
of finitude that Western philosophy, Heidegger contends, has attempted 
to deal with Being. Western philosophy—more specifically, Western 
metaphysics—has not reached out to the level of Being—to ontology— 
but has confined itself to ontic matters at the expense of ontological ones. 
Not only that, the very nature of metaphysics, Heidegger insists, excludes 
it from the matter of Being,* 9 and metaphysics, therefore, “in essence is 
nihilism.”10 This is why Heidegger has repeatedly referred to his phi­
losophy as an endeavor to transcend metaphysics, to get back to the 
“ground” of metaphysics, to “foundational thought” {das wesentliche 
Denken). But this is not easy, for as Heidegger contends, not only meta­
physics, but all logical and rational thought normally associated with 
metaphysics must also be transcended. Reason itself. In fact, “founda­
tional thinking starts only when we have experienced that reason, ex­
• “Dai Nichts ist unpritaglicher als das Nicht und die Verncinung” {Ibid., p. 28).
9 “Als Metaphysik ist sie von dcr Erfahrung des Seins durch ihr eigenes Wcscn 
ausgeschlossen” {Ibid., p. 20).
10 “In ihrem Wesen aber ist die Metaphysik Nihilismus” {Holzwege [Frankfurt: 
Klostcrmann, 1950], p. 245). Hereafter cited as HW.
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tolled for hundreds of years, is the toughest obstacle to thought.”11 
This brings us to another dimension in Heidegger’s philosophy, one 
that, though most frequently cited by critics, is most frequently misunder­
stood: Dasein.
11 “Das Dcnkcn bcginnt ent dann, wenn wir erfahren haben, das die sdt Jahr- 
hunderten verherrlichte Vemunft die hartnackigste Widers&cherin des Denkens iat” 
(Ibid., p. 247).
11 A Commentary on Heidegger’r Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 
pp. 22-23.
1 * “Die ontische Auszcichnung des Daseins liegt darin, das es ontologisch irt” (SZ, 
p. 12).
14 Ibid., p. 13.
Not only are Being and Non-being, because of their distinctive onto­
logical character, a transcendence, Dasein too is a transcendence. It is 
true that Dasein is an entity, but a very special entity, Heidegger reminds 
us, in that its being is an issue for it, and in the fact that it comports itself 
toward Being. And because Dasein has this affinity toward Being, though 
itself a being, it cannot be said to reside exclusively on the ontic plane. 
What is interesting about Dasein—yet confusing for many critics—is that 
it is both ontic and ontological. That this aspect of Dasein is confusing is 
evident even in the attempts at translation. Michael Gelven, for example, 
tries to correct Macquarrie and Robinson’s famous translation of 
‘‘being there” with “being here” on the supposition that “here” is more 
suggestive of the immediacy which Heidegger intended.12 Yet, if we ex­
amine Sein und Zeit closely, Heidegger contends unequivocally that 
“the ontic character of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological”;13 14
moreover, that Dasein is that “thereness which is ontologically farthest.”1* 
It would seem, then, that Gclven’s rendition of “being here” as opposed 
to “being there” is still not sufficient. A more genuine rendition of 
Dasein would be one that would suggest both “being here” and “being 
there.”
This is not superficial, semantic disagreement, for it has to do with 
the very important business of not only defining but locating Dasein. 
Too often Dasein is equated with man. Critics usually assume that when 
Heidegger uses Dasein, he means man. But this is not Heidegger’s inten­
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tion at all. The “there” of Dasein (literally, therc-Being) is not something 
man possesses, but what is bequeathed to him—ontologically—as he is 
thrown (Geworfenheit) in the world. As Heidegger explains, “more original 
than man is the finiteness of Dasein in him.”15 Dasein, thus, has onto­
logical priority over man’s anthropological givenness, and it has this 
priority precisely because Dasein is the gateway to Being, or if you will, 
the threshold between beings and Being. But just as Dasein cannot be 
equated with man, neither can it be equated with human consciousness. 
Consciousness, by anyone’s definition, is psychological, exclusively as­
sociated with the psyche. But Dasein, transcending consciousness, is not 
psychological; it is ontological: the ontological realm which exists between 
beings and Being, the vehicle, in fact, through which Being may be 
unconcealed or concealed. Thus, just as there is an integral connection 
between Being and Non-being in Heidegger’s philosophy, there is also 
an integral connection between Dasein and Being, between Dasein and 
Non-being.16
15 “Ursprunglicher alsder Mensch ist die Eodlichkeit de* Dasein in ihm” (KM, p. 207).
x# This is not the extent of Heidegger’s ontological circuitry. In his final writings, 
Heidegger poses an even higher ontological dimension than Being and Non-being. Just 
as there must be an ontological source for beings, there must be an ontological source for 
Being and Non-being; and in naming that highest, appropriative ontological source he 
employs the extremely problematic term, Ereigms. This is the ontological source for 
Heidegger, for it is the source out of which everything—beings, Being, and Non-being— 
must necessarily arise. For a discussion of Ereigms and its relation to Zen, sec my article, 
“Transmctaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” which appeared in 
Philosophy Eart and West (July, 1977).
II
Like Heidegger, Zen bases its realization on what might be called an 
attitudinal understanding (if attitudinal not be restricted to consciousness, 
which is to say, to a psychological perspective). Also like Heidegger, 
Zen recognizes anxiety as being instrumental to self-realization. Zen 
differs from Heidegger, however, in that anxiety is only a precursor to 
self-discovery, a stage to be endured before arriving at ultimate realiza­
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tion.17 *19As I have explained elsewhere,11 despite Heidegger’s quest for 
the “Homeland” and for “quietude,” restlessness is the most pervasive 
feature of his philosophy. One is led to believe (at least this writer is led 
to believe) that Heidegger’s philosophy is enmeshed in—but never succeeds 
in overcoming—the “great doubt block”1* of Zen; moreover, that the 
“great doubt block” is never overcome because of Heidegger’s failure to 
reconcile what he hoped to reconcile: the duality of beings and Being, 
and the duality between Being and Non-being.
17 According to Suzuki, 4'when Hui-neng speaks of the Unconscious in Conscious­
ness, be steps beyond psychology” (771/ Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, cd. Christmas Hum­
phreys [London: Rider and Company, 1969], p. 61).
*• See my article, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism.”
19 As Richard DeMartino explains, “the great doubt block” is a “radical contradic­
tion” which the ego must “come to be,” a contradiction, moreover, in which the “ego in 
ego-consciousness” is “totally and exhaustively exacerbated” {Zen Buddhism and Psycho­
analysis [New York: Grove Press, i960], p. 164). But this, of course, is not the final goal, 
for the ego must die a “great death,” which leads to a "great awakening” in which the 
ego becomes “ego-Self, or Self-ego” {Ibid., pp. 167, 170).
Though Heidegger contends that Non-being is not an additive to beings 
and that Non-being is not an additive to Being, he nonetheless postulates 
a connection, even though, as he stipulates, the connection is not spatial. 
Though Heidegger’s connections arc qualitative, not quantitative, 
though they are to be understood ontologically as moods or dwellings, 
they arc connections nonetheless. Though Heidegger contends that 
one “dwells” in the world in such a way that one is “in” the world not 
the way a book is in the library but the way a doctor is “in” a profession, 
the relation between person and profession is still one of connection, 
although it be an integral connection (both person and profession being 
necessary to preserve the ontological status of being “in”). In Heidegger’s 
philosophy, Being and Non-being are always never absolute!?
the Same. Though Non-being “is” (never abandoning its status as Being), 
he could never say that it is absolutely Being; and he could never do this 
because, as we have seen, Non-being is always “concealment” in contrast 
to Being, which is “unconcealment.” Integral they are, but never abso­
lutely the Same. In Zen, however, let us say briefly for now, they arc 
absolutely the Same.
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Just as Heidegger could never affirm that Being and Non-being are 
absolutely the Same, neither could he affirm that Being and Non- 
being are absolutely Different. Non-being, he maintains, always “is,” in 
the sense of never abandoning its sense of Being (beyond beings), and 
in the sense of always presupposing beings, for Non-being is but the 
“veil” of Being, as Being conceals itself. Again, integral they are, but 
never absolutely Different. In Zen, however, it must be said (again briefly), 
just as they are absolutely the Same, they are, paradoxically, absolutely 
Different', thus, whereas Heidegger postulates the integral connection of the 
Non-being of Being, Zen postulates the paradox of Non-being-Being.™
For Zen, Non-being is not a principle of ontological oscillation,21 
but a principle of ontological negation and affirmation at the same time. 
Only he who can assert that Non-being absolutely is and is not Being 
understands Non-being in Zen. Ultimately, of course, “is” and “is not” 
cannot adequately transmit this paradoxical nature of Non-being, and 
before this paradox language seems to crumble. In fact, Zen would go 
so far to say that as soon as one thinks of Being or Non-being as either 
“separate” or “one” or even “united,” one has reduced them to phe­
nomena, stripped them of their ontological status. Only when Being and 
Non-being enter phenomenality can they take on such discernible pro­
perties, but this is precisely why Heidegger has never really advanced 
beyond the phenomenal plane, never succeeded in transcending meta­
physics. All of this is not to suggest that Zen’s understanding of Being 
and Non-being is “beyond” the phenomenal world; for that most cer­
tainly would be dualistic! Rather, Being and Non-being ultimately Are 
beings, just as they Are Not beings. Zen’s ontology is not reserved for a 
special sphere above beings, but Is beings in a way that transcends the
10 “Form (ru/w) does not differ from the void (x&pvtd),” it is written in the Heart 
Sutra, but with the qualification, “nor the void from form. Form is identical with void 
(and) void is identical with form” (Quoted in Charles Luk, Ch'an and Zen Teaching, 
First Series [Berkeley: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 1970], p. 213). And this is essen­
tially the meaning of Richard DeMartino’s paradoxical term, “non-dualistic dualism” 
(Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 169).
31 What Suzuki refers to as timeless time (Zen and Japanese Culture, Bollingen Series 
xxiv [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959], p. 239).
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meaning which our ordinary usage of “is” implies.
Heidegger, like Buber (although with an obviously more extensive 
ontological thrust), is concerned with relations: the relations between 
beings and other beings, between beings and Being, between Dastin 
and Being, between Being and Time, between Being and Non-being. 
But Zen refuses to dabble in such distinctions, even though they be, in 
Heidegger’s sense, integral. Zen, in contradistinction to Heidegger, 
would never approve of Being’s inseparable “relation” to Non-being or 
of Daseins “relation” to Being. For Zen, rather, Being Is Non-being and 
Is Not Non-being in such a way that relation itself may be said to be 
shattered. Heidegger, therefore, never genuinely succeeds in his lifelong 
quest—the overcoming of metaphysics—because he never succeeds 
in overcoming a tendency that has pervaded metaphysics from the time 
of Plato (including thinkers like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Buber, Jaspers, 
and Tillich), a tendency of “piecing” opposites together, matching them 
up, as it were. This tendency represents the language of synthesis, not 
paradox. Zen differs fundamentally from all of Western thinking (except 
possibly Meister Eckhart) in its downright refusal to think in synthetic 
terms. Synthetic thinking can only be a precursor to paradoxical thinking 
(in the recognition of the inseparability of opposites), but ultimately 
synthesis (and the opposites it presupposes) must be transcended so that 
they absolutely Are and Are Not each other al the same time. Only when one 
can realize that Being Is Non-being, that Life Is Death,22 that I Am 
Thou can one enter Zen territory. The obvious reaction to ail this by 
Western metaphysicians (including Heidegger) would be, “How can 
this be possible? How can Life Be Death? How can Being Be Non- 
being?” The problem is that Western metaphysics extends its vision only 
through the lenses of ordinary consciousness, and from that perspective 
these paradoxes are impossible. But Zen would say, on a higher level of 
consciousness—on a higher level of existence—these paradoxes are indeed 
possible. Zen does not restrict itself to the possible as understood by the 
11 For a discussion of the Zen position on Life and Death—especially in contrast to 
Western thinking—see my article, “Symbolism and Death in Jung and Zen Buddhism,” 
Philosophy East and West (April, 1975).
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ordinary mind, to the possible as understood by Heidegger’s supposedly 
more probing mind (the fundamental thinking of Dasein), but deals in 
the Possible, in Impossible-Possibility,23 in that which transcends the 
distinctions imposed by the ordinary mind.24
” In Yoka Daishi’s "Song of Enlightenment,* * it is written: “Let others speak ill of 
me, let others spite me/Those who try to bum the sky with a torch end in tiring them­
selves out;/I listen to them and taste their evil speaking as nectar;/All melts away and 
I find myself suddenly within the Unthinkable itself" (Quoted in D. T. Suzuki, Manual 
of Zen BtuUhim [New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1960], pp. 92-3).
** Even the seemingly minor concepts employed here to discuss major ones (major 
only in the sense of the focus of this study) must be taken paradoxically. For example, 
when it is said that concealment and unconcealment exist simultaneously, this is not to 
imply that they exist in a moment cut off from other moments but that time itself is 
transcended in such a way that every moment must be thought of as an Eternal-Present or 
a Timeless-Now. Everything—absolutely everything —must be subject to paradox in Zen.
15 “Transmetaphysieal Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism.’*
Metaphysics is a speculative, theoretical kind of knowledge expressed 
and argued in onto-theo-logical terms—terms such as Being and Non- 
being, appearance and reality, existence and essence, particular and 
universal. On one level, Zen does engage in such a metaphysics by em­
ploying metaphysical terminology; but Zen does not stop there, with 
Being and Non-being in their exclusiveness, in their oneness, or in their 
integralness. In contradistinction to Western metaphysics in general, 
and in contradistinction to what I have elsewhere referred to as 
Heidegger’s “quasi-metaphysics,”25 Zen takes these metaphysical issues 
and elevates them to a transmetaphysieal dimension in which the issues 
(though obviously serving as a starting point) must ultimately be tran­
scended. Although beginning with a metaphysical foundation (what 
else is a student of Zen to do but start with the natural bifurcations of 
his conscious mind?), Zen transcends such a foundation by grounding it, 
not in an integral ontology, but groundlessly in what is transmetaphysi- 
cally Differently-Self-Same prior to any metaphysical endeavor that 
would attempt to decipher such distinctions. In this sense, Zen’s trans­
metaphysics, unlike Western metaphysics—unlike Heidegger’s “quasi­
metaphysics”—is not speculative and does not allow itself to get trapped 
in problematic distinctions. Zen does not suffer the interplay of endless 
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speculation that arises in Heidegger’s onto-theo-logical analysis but 
prefers to leave such a troublesome ground for what might be said to be 
a trans-onto-thM-logical-gTOundUss-gTound or, as I have put it, contrasting 
this with Heidegger, Non-being-Being.
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